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NOTES AND COMMENTS
fy his premises ;4 only then may he make the required appli-
cation under the decontrol order. A landlord is not eligible
to be considered for decontrol until both steps have been tak-
en. An increase in rent without authorization is a violation
of the regulations.5
TORTS
INDEPENDENT INTERVENING CAUSE
P was riding in an automobile driven by D when it
overturned. No one was injured, and the passengers of the
car immediately set about to right the car. While assisting,
P cut his wrist on broken window glass, for which injury
he brought suit. D was found negligent in operating the
automobile and liable for P's injuries. Held: Affirined,
P's act was the normal response to the stimulus of the sit-
uation created by D's negligence and not a superseding cause
which would relieve D of liability. Hatch v. Smail, 23 N.W.
(2d) 460 (Wis. 1946).
In the principal case, D claimed that his negligence was
not the proximate cause of the injury,' but that P's voluntary
act in helping to right the car was an independent interven-
ing force which cut off the chain of causation from D's
negligence, and set in movement a new chain.2 But the chain
4. 11 Fed. Reg. 13038 (Nov. 2, 1946). Rooms are to be classified
as transient hotel, residential hotel, rooming house and motor
court. Only those classed as transient hotel and motor court
room are eligible for decontrol .
5. Wilfully raising rent without first qualifying may be criminal
violation of the Emergency Price Control Act, 50 U.S.C.A. (App.)
§901 et seq. ( ). Wilton v. U.S., 156 F.(2d) 433 (C.C.A. 4th
1946).
1. In determining proximate cause, the "substantial factor" test has
been stressed in Indiana in recent years, Swanson v. Slagel, 212
Ind. 394, 8 N.E. (2d) 993 (1937); the courts often speak in terms
of "material contribution", "direct cause" or "efficient cause",
Earl v. Porter, 112 Ind. App. 71, 40 N.E.(2d) 381 (1942;
Cousins v. Glassburn, 216 Ind. 431, 24 N.E.(2d) 1013 (1940);
Columbia Creosoting Co. v. Beard, 52 Ind. App. 260, 99 N.E.
823 (1912); See Harper, "Development in the Law of Torts"
(1946) .21 Ind. L.J. 447,453. Foreseeability is an essential element
of proximate cause in Indiana, see Dalton Foundries v. Jeffries,
114 Ind. App. 271,283, 51 N.E.(2d) 13,18 (1943); For a dis-
cussion of the use of foreseeability in determining proximate
cause, see Harper, supra at 455.
2. An intervening cause is one not produced by prior negligence,
but independent of it, which interrupts the course of events so
as to produce a result different from the one that could have
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of causation is not broken where his negligent conduct creates
a situation calculated to invite or induce the intervention
of some subsequent cause as a normal response.3 Normal
reactions not operating as superseding causes have been
held to include the attempt to avert harm4 the impulse to
assist others in emergencies,5 as well as the instinct toward
preservation of person or property, including escape from
peril caused by D's negligence.6 The test to determine whe-
been anticipated and is itself the natural and logical cause of
the harm, see 38 Am. Jur. 22; Tabor v. Continental Baking Co.,
110 Ind. App. 633,643, 38 N.E.(2d) 257,261 (1941); City of
Indianapolis v. Willis, 208 Ind. 607, 194 N.E. 343 (1935) (taxi
driver's negligence in driving into canal at street end on rainy,
foggy night was not a sufficient intervening cause of passenger's
death to preclude recovery from city for its negligent failure
to erect barricades or warnings).
3. Restatement, "Torts" (1934) §§443,445; Milwaukee & St. Paul
Ry. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469 (1876); Littell v. Argus Production
C., 78 F.(2d) 955 (C.C.A. 10th, 1935); Brown v. New York
Cent. Ry., 53 F.(2d) 490 (E.D. Mich., 1931), aff'd. 63 F.(2d)
657 (C.C.A. 6th, 1933), cert. denied 290 U.S. 634 (1933), (P's
voluntary act in climbing up railroad car to reach brake wheel
when automatic coupling failed was not an independent intervening
force which would relieve D of liability for providing faulty
equipment); Pitcairn v. Whiteside, 109 Ind. App. 693, 34 N.E.
(2d) 943 (1941); Kramer v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. Ry.,
226 Wis. 118, 276 N.W. 113 (1937).
4. Hedgecock v. Orlosky, 220 Ind. 390, 44 N.E.(2d( 93 (1942) (at-
tempting to avert further harm by unlocking car bumpers);
Superior Oil Co. v. Richmond, 172 Miss. 407, 159 So. 850 (1935)
(act of another in throwing electric switch to stop oil pump and
avert harm from burning oil, did not supersede negligence of
oil company's servant in permitting storage tank to overflow.
"Natural and ordinary thing for one to do . . . would be to
attempt to prevent the threatened harm.") Wilson v. Northern
Pacific Ry., 30 N.D. 456, 153 N.W. 429 (1915).
5. Brugh v. Bigelow, 310 Mich. 74, 16 N.W.(2d) 668 (1944) (pas-
sersby should be anticipated to relieve dire necessity resulting
from accidents, as rescue is usual response in such circumstances) ;
Wagner v. International Ry., 232 N.Y. 176, 1S3 N.E. 437 (1921),
19 A.L.R. 1,4 (1922) Ithe land-mark case presenting Cardozo's
"rescue" doctrine): Restatement, "Torts" (1934) §472.
6. Littell v. Argus Production Co., 78 F.(2d) 955 (C.C.A. 10th,
1935) (farmer's voluntary act in pulling cable to free cultivator
from entanglement was not independent intervening cause reliev-
ing D of liability for injuries resulting to P and machine from
negligent burying of oil derrick anchors); Chicago Great West-
ern Ry., v. Machie, 60 F.(2d) 384 (C.C.A. 8th, 1932) (P's vol-
untary conduct in attempting to free horse which had been
caused to stumble due to D's negligent maintenance of railroad
crossing was not an independent intervening force, and D was
liable for P's injuries received in trying to free it); Churchman
v. Sonoma County, 59 Cal. App.(2d) 801, 140 P.(2d) 81 (1943)
(P's act in extricating himself from partially overturned car did
not break chain of causation created by D's negligent failure to
properly maintain roadways). See also Handelun v. Burlington,
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ther there was a continuous succession of events leading
proximately from fault to injury is whether P's act was a
normal response to the stimulus of a dangerous situation
created by the fault of D.'
The theory followed in cases allowing recovery in situa-
tions similar to that of the principal case is that the defend-
ant's force is really continuing in active operation by means
of the force it stimulates into activity. Where P was induced
to act by the negligent calling of a railway station and was
thereby injured, the negligence of the railway company, and
not P's voluntary conduct, was held to be the proximate
cause as it set in motion the chain of events leading up to
the injury.8 D's negligence was also held to be the proxi-
mate cause of the injuries where D hit the back of a truck,
and P, a passer-by, in attempting to help, got between the
two cars and was crushed when another car hit the rear
truck. P's intervening act was held to be a normal reaction
to the stimulus of the situation created by D's negligence
and did not break the chain of causation., In another case,
P's act in extricating himself from a partially overturned
car was held not to break the chain of causation created by
D's negligent failure to properly maintain the roadways,
and the county was held for P's injuries. P's getting out
of the car was a reaction that could be expected and causa-
tion continued.'0 In these cases, as in the principal one, the
C.R. & N. Ry., 72 Iowa 709, 32 N.W. 4 (1887); Scott v. Shep-
herd, 2 Black. W. 892 (C.P. 1772) (the squib case). When
placed in a position of peril, not created by one's own negligence,
one has a right to make a choice of means to be used to avoid
the peril, and is not held to a strict accountability for taking
an unwise course, Zoludow v. Keeshin Motor Express, 109 Ind.
App. 575, 34 N.E.(2d) 980 (1941).
7. Anti-Mite Engineering Co. v. Peerman, 113 Ind. App. 280, 46
N.E. (2d) 262 (1942); Riesbeck Drug Co. v. Wray, 111 Ind. App.
467, 39 N.E.(2d) 776 (1941); New York Central Ry. v. Brown,
63 F. (2d) 657, (C.C.A. 6th, 1933), cert. denied 290 U.S. 634 (1933).
8. Cincinnati, Hamilton & Indianapolis Ry. v. Worthington, 30 Ind.
App. 663, 65 N.E. 557 (1902). Cf. International-Great Northern
Ry. v. Lowry, 132 Tex. 272, 121 S.W.(2d) 585 (1938) (negligence
of conductor in failing to notify train to stop at certain point
held not the legal cause of injuries of brakeman who jumped
from train to make repairs, as it was not such a natural and
probable consequence of negligence as could have been anticipated).
9. Rovinski v. Rowe, 131 F.(2d) 687 (C.C.A. 6th, 1942).
10. Churchman v. Sonoma County, 59 Cal. App.(2d) 801, 140 P. (2d)
81 (1943). Recovery here can also be explained on the perilous
position doctrine that being put in a dangerous position invites
19471
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defendants' liability continued, as plaintiffs' acts were nor-
mal responses to the stimuli of the dangerous situations
created by fault of the particular defandant and not inde-
pendent intervening forces.
escape. The issue of sudden peril is ordinarily for the determina-
tion of the jury, Hedgecock v. Orlosky, 220 Ind. 390, 44 N.E.(2d)
93 (1942).
